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ABSTRACT
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are deployed in more and more classification systems,
but adversarial samples can be maliciously crafted to trick them, and are becoming a real threat.
There have been various proposals to improve CNNs’ adversarial robustness but these all suffer
performance penalties or other limitations. In this paper, we provide a new approach in the form
of a certifiable adversarial detection scheme, the Certifiable Taboo Trap (CTT). The system can
provide certifiable guarantees of detection of adversarial inputs for certain l∞ sizes on a reasonable
assumption, namely that the training data have the same distribution as the test data. We develop
and evaluate several versions of CTT with a range of defense capabilities, training overheads and
certifiability on adversarial samples. Against adversaries with various lp norms, CTT outperforms
existing defense methods that focus purely on improving network robustness. We show that CTT
has small false positive rates on clean test data, minimal compute overheads when deployed, and can
support complex security policies.
1 Introduction
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) give the best performance on visual applications [1, 18, 32] and are now
spreading into safety-critical fields, including autonomous vehicles [11], face recognition [34] and human action
recognition [16]. However, small perturbations can be crafted to trigger misclassifications that are not perceptible by
humans [14]. Researchers have demonstrated adversarial samples that can exploit face-recognition systems to break
into smartphones [6] and misdirect autonomous vehicles by perturbing road signs [10]. These adversarial samples can
be surprisingly portable. Samples generated from one classifier transfer to others, making them a potential large-scale
threat to real-life systems.
Since most of these attacks use neural network gradient information to generate perturbations [14], the obvious defense
is to improve the networks’ classification robustness, such as training classifiers with these adversarial images. Such
adversarial training significantly increases the performance of CNNs on adversarial samples but falls short in three
ways. First, it assumes the defender has prior knowledge of the attacks; second, the defense is not certifiable; third,
building a fully robust model is still an unsolved question [33]. In this paper, we look at a different defense strategy,
namely adversarial sample detection. Researchers have shown that many adversarial samples are detectable, and
detection methods normally hold no prior knowledge of attackers [26, 36]. We built on the existing Taboo Trap
detection scheme [36], whose focus is on finding overly excited neurons being driven out-of-bound from a pre-defined
range by adversarial perturbations. We propose a mechanism, the Certifiable Taboo Trap (CTT), that combines the
original Taboo Trap detection with numerical bound propagation, making the detection bounds on CNN activation
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values certifiable against certain input perturbation sizes. For input perturbations at a particular l∞ value, CTT can
verify detection, meaning that CTT guarantees the detected samples are adversarial inputs.
In this paper, we propose three versions of CTT: lite, loose and strict. CTT-lite requires no additional fine-tuning on a
pretrained model, and can provide basic protection against weak adversaries. CTT-loose retrains on a random set of
selected activations with propagated numerical interval bounds, and provides a loose guarantee that all samples detected
are adversarial. Finally, CTT-strict fine-tunes with more strict numerical interval bounds and thus is able to provide
the same guarantee as CTT-loose on attackers with small l∞ values; in addition, CTT-strict can verify detection on a
pre-defined range of l∞ values.
The contributions of this paper are:
• We introduce a novel certifiable detection scheme for adversarial samples.
• We show CTT-lite, a new detection method that is fine-tuning free but relatively limited in its defense capability.
We demonstrate how to optimise detection boundaries through fine-tuning and introduce CTT-loose and CTT-
strict. Assuming the test and training data distributions are the same, both detection schemes ensure that all
detected samples are adversarial, CTT-strict even guarantees detections on adversarial samples with particular
range of pre-defined l∞ bounds.
• We show the detection results on all versions of CTT. For the first time, we empirically demonstrate how
certifiable detection scheme (CTT-loose and CTT-strict) can have above 90% detection ratios on all attacks
experimented on MNIST.
2 Related Work
The field of adversarial machine learning has seen a rapid co-evolution of attack and defense since researchers
discovered adversarial samples [38]. The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is an early adversarial attack that generates
perturbations using the signs of the network gradients, and is still a simple yet effective way of finding adversarial
samples [14]. The FGSM attack can be extended in an iterative way to look for smaller perturbations, giving the
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Method or the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [20, 25]. The Carlini & Wagner
attack (CW) formulates an optimization problem, whose solution gives an adversarial sample [5]. However, a strong
adversarial image is time-consuming to generate since it requires a large number of search iterations and binary search
steps. Many of the attacks can change their optimization focus or be constrained on certain lp norms in an iterative run.
In our setup, we use the term lp-bound attack to differentiate the same attack bounded by various lp norms.
An interesting feature of adversarial samples is their transferability [38, 43, 14]. Adversarial samples that work well on
a given neural network often transfer to a different type of network trained on the same dataset. This makes black-box
adversarial attacks possible. Another way of finding black-box attacks is the gradient estimation method, which uses
estimated gradient information instead of true gradients [2]. Estimation involves building an output distribution based
on information queried from the target model.
Many defenses against adversarial attacks have been proposed, most of them relying on improving classification
robustness. Adversarial training adds adversarial samples to the training set, so that the model becomes more robust at
classification boundaries [14, 20]. Pang et al. use an ensemble of models to increase decision robustness [30], while
Mustafa et al. use class-wise disentanglement to restrict feature maps crossing the decision boundaries [29]. However,
Schott et al. showed that even building robust classification on the small MNIST data remains an unsolved question [33].
They also proposed the analysis and synthesis (ABS) method using class-conditioned data and demonstrate better
robustness on the MNIST classification task.
Many researchers have tried to detect adversarial samples [26, 24, 27, 35]. Magnet claims that detection is possible by
inspecting the reconstruction error of a trained autoencoder [26]. SafetyNet proposed SVM classifiers to recognize
adversaries through neural activation patterns [24]. However, both of these detection methods rely on auxiliary
components, which have two main problems. First, they impose a significant computational overhead. Second, an
adversary might obtain a copy of the defense and devise an adversarial sample to defeat it [4, 7].
Another efficient detection scheme is the Taboo Trap [36], where a random subset of neurons are constrained in
training and an alarm is set off when some threshold of them become overly excited. This imposes no extra runtime
computational costs, and the constrained subset of neurons can be randomly picked, giving what amounts to a key
that can be different each time the network is trained. This makes Black-box attacks more challenging as there can be
multiple independently-keyed networks each of which is vulnerable to different adversarial samples [37]. Our work
builds on the Taboo Trap, and answers the question of how to make adversarial sample detections certifiable. It also
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(a) Original Taboo Trap.
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(b) False positives (in red).
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(c) Undetectable range (in blue).
Figure 1: Taboo Trap visualisation. If x is from the original data distribution, a strict bound causes them to be detected
as adversarial samples, the red area shows the false positive samples (middle figure). If x is an adversarial sample, loose
bounds cause detection fail on adversarial samples with small l∞ values (blue part in figure on the right).
estalishes the optimal numerical range limit on neurons, and thus significantly improves the detection performance of
the Taboo Trap.
Our work can also be viewed as being related to certifiable robustness where the prediction of a data point x is
verifiably constant with perturbations of a certain lp norm. When queried with the input data x, x will be perturbed
by isotropic Gaussian noise and multiple inference runs are executed on a base classifier f [8, 23], in this way, the
returned classification provides the most probable prediction made by f with a Gaussian corrupted x. Meanwhile,
certification of adversarial samples can be achieved using bound interval propagation, which is becoming established as
a means of formal verification of neural networks [15, 9, 39, 40, 13, 28, 17]. Several prior works have studied efficient
relaxation methods for computing tight bounds on the neural network outputs [39, 40]. Our Certifiable Taboo Trap uses
bound-interval propagation, but its focus is on certifying out-of-bound values in a set of randomly sampled intermediate
activations. The interval bounding is a simple integral bound so the computation overhead is minimised [28].
3 Method
3.1 Taboo Trap: A Practical View
The method shown here extends the Taboo Trap originally presented by [36, 37]. First, we will explain the Taboo Trap
method and then demonstrate the extension made for producing a relaxed guarantee that a certain l∞ bound attacker
will always be detected.
The Taboo Trap is based on the idea that neural network activations can be forced to form a distribution when trained
with extra regularisations. Regularisations are based on activation values, and bound a set of activations inside a certain
numerical range. No training set inputs trigger this chosen set of activation values to be out of range. So if one of these
‘taboo’ activations is observed, it signals that the current input may be adversarial. As different instances of the model
can be trained with different taboo sets, the authors coined a term of a transfer function, which essentially served as a
neural network key. In the original Taboo Trap, Shumailov et al. made use of the nth-max percentile activation bounds
profiled from a trained network [36]. They later used polynomial keys [37]. Yet, the detection rates reported were less
than ideal: the nth-max percentile function only detects weak attackers, while polynomial-based detectors show good
detection rates on transfer attacks but perform worse under direct attack.
The Taboo Trap authors hypothesised that its performance is related to the choice of transfer functions, yet could not
explain why some attackers could not be detected. While their experiments show a practical ability to detect adversaries,
there is little theoretical understanding of how and why it worked.
3.2 Taboo Trap: A Theoretical View
In this section, we provide a theoretical understanding of how operating on the high dimensional activation space can
detect adversarial samples. Assume that we have a linear function f(x) = ax+ b for illustration simplicity. The simple
integral bound of the linear function with input bounded between xmin and xmax is bounded by f(xmin) and f(xmax).
Figure 1a presents how the original Taboo Trap will instrument function f with a nth max percentile transfer function.
xmin and xmax represent the minimum and maximum values x can take. Since network inputs are bounded, the
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intermediate layers should receive inputs that are also bounded, regardless of non-linearities. Being monotonic
functions, f(xmin) and f(xmax) present the minimum and maximum values that the function f can naturally assume.
If Thigh represents the Taboo Trap threshold; we have:{
f(x) ≤ Thigh Benign
f(x) > Thigh Malicious
(1)
We define an adversarial sample xˆ = x+ , with its l∞ norm having the size of . With different detection thresholds
(Thigh), we can have natural samples becoming false positives or adversarial samples becoming undetectable. Figure 1b
shows the scenario when Thigh < f(xmax): there exists a clean sample x with an output f(x) being in between Thigh
and f(xmax). This triggers natural samples to be misclassified as adversarial (false positives). Figure 1c presents the
case that Thigh > f(xmax): adversarial samples xˆ can generate output f(xˆ) smaller than Thigh so that it becomes
undetectable by the Taboo Trap framework. In summary:
{
Thigh > f(xmax) Missed detection
Thigh < f(xmax) False positives
(2)
Consider r = |f(xmax)− Thigh|, it means
• if r equals to zero, the adversarial samples will always get detected.
• for a given r it is easy to compute what type and how many of perturbations will go undetectable.
• as mentioned by Shumailov et al. , there is a direct measurable trade-off between false positives, accuracy and
detection rate.
Using the method defined above, it becomes apparent that all monotonic transfer functions should theoretically work in
Taboo Trap, and have a trade-off between accuracy, false positive and detection rates.
Perturbations can also exist in the range between xmin and xmax. The original Taboo Trap paper observed that better
detector performance is achieved by setting a small threshold value, yet training becomes hard. Our hypothesis is that
reducing the distance between xmin and xmax leads to a reduced number of perturbations in the natural image range.
It is also worth noting that detection occurs on post-ReLU activation values, and only the positive numerical range and
the positive numerical threshold (Thigh) are considered. For simplicity, we use Tl to represent a layer-wise threshold
scalar in later descriptions.
3.3 Interval Bound Propagation
For simplicity, we consider a feed-forward CNN F consisting of a sequence of convolution layers, where the lth layer
computes output feature maps xl ∈ RCl×Hl×Wl . xl is a collection of feature maps with Cl channels of Hl ×Wl
images.
The first stage of CTT is to compute the activation bounds from a pretrained network. Given the pretrained weights
and the numerical bounds of inputs, CTT computes the numerical bounds for each layer in the CNN. Assuming the a
set of lower and upper bound for layer l is (Blowl , B
up
l ), where B
low
l is the lower bound and B
up
l is the upper bound
respectively, we have
Blowl+1 = Convb(Wl, B
low
l )
Bupl+1 = Convb(Wl, B
up
l )
(3)
Notice Blow0 and B
high
0 will be the boundaries on the input, obtained from profiling on the natural input data samples.
Both Blowl and B
up
l have the same dimensions as xl. The interval bound propagation in Equation (3) can be seen
as a series of abstract interpolations in a convolution (Convb) [40, 28]. Given scalar bounds ml ≤ m ≤ mh
and nl ≤ n ≤ nh, we define an operation (ml,mh) ∩ (nl, nh) produces a tighter bound pl = max(ml, nl) and
ph = min(mh, nh):
(ml,mh) ∩ (nl, nh) = (max(ml,ml),min(nh, nh)) (4)
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(a) Optimal placement of Tl.
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up
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up
l
Dist of X
Tl
(b) Suboptimal placement of Tl.
Figure 2: Placements of the detection threshold Tl with different boundaries from both the natural activations (X) and
the adversarial activations (Xˆ). This indicates that both the numerical value of Tl and the two distributions should be
optimised using fine-tuning.
This is equivalent to abstract interpolation in the interval domain (the box domain) [28]. Notice the bound propagation
can also be performed for adversarial inputs, where the upper bound of the input becomes Bˆup0 = B
up
0 +  and  is the
size of the l∞ norm. We then define (Bˆlowl , Bˆ
up
l ) to be a pair of upper bound and lower bound for layer l for adversarial
inputs with an l∞ budget of .
Considering the case in the middle layer l, we obtain a particular activation value x and its values across all input data
distributions can be seen as a set X . Meanwhile, its values for all adversarial samples with an adversarial perturbation
can be viewed as a set Xˆ . For convenience, we call X the natural set and Xˆ the adversarial set. Figure 2 shows
the placements of the detection threshold Tl. In the ideal case, if the distributions of the natural set (X) and the
adversarial set (Xˆ) are disjoint, the optimal placement of Tl is that B
up
l <= Tl <= Bˆ
low
l . However, in practice, the
natural set and the adversarial set might overlap (Figure 2b), meaning that there is only a sub-optimal placement option
Bupl ≤ Tl ≤ Bˆupl . For these two threshold placements, we conclude:
• Optimal placement of Tl ( Bupl ≤ Tl ≤ Bˆlowl ) ensures that all adversarial samples with l∞ norm at the size of
 are detectable (Figure 2a).
• Both optimal and suboptimal placements (Bupl ≤ Tl ≤ Bˆupl ) of Tl ensure that all detected samples are
adversarial regardless of the perturbation size (Figure 2b).
The above claims are true if and only if the following assumption holds: The test data distribution falls inside the
training data distribution. In other words, the test data falls in the range of the maximum and minimum bounds profiled
from the training dataset. The rest of this section discusses methodologies we used to ensure that placements of Tl are
near-optimal. In Section 3.4, we show a training-free method of finding the position of Tl. In Section 3.5, several losses
are discussed that help to force the placement of Tl towards optimal and suboptimal.
3.4 Taboo Trap for Free
One major bottleneck of defending adversarial samples is the training overhead. Classic methods like adversarial
training increase model robustness by training with additional adversarial data points and thus significantly increase the
training time. CTT can be deployed without any additional fine-tuning, and we name this detection mode CTT-lite.
We previously introduced the concept of a detection threshold value. Recall the definition of a particular layer’s output
activations xl, CTT uses a randomised binary mask mdl that is the same size of xl to decided on which activation
values to restrict on. Unlike [37] who used different transfer functions as keys, in this work we represent different keys
as different subsets of neurons that are instrumented with CTT. We find that such construction has all of the benefits
described by [37] originally. Practically, CTT only detects on xl ·mdl , where · is a Hadamard product (element-wise
multiplication) between matrices.
CTT-lite simply places Tl at the upper boundary of the natural set so that Tl = B
up
l . In the original Taboo Trap setup,
as in Section 3.2, this effectively means r = |f(xmax)− T | = 0. So the only additional computation is to perform the
interval bound propagation for deducing the value of Tl in each layer, and no additional training is required. Note that
as the bounds are computed for the training dataset it will have false positives for the evaluation dataset.
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Algorithm 1 Certifiable Taboo Trap finetuning process
Inputs: α, β, θ, f , x, y, , E
md = RandomMaskGen(β)
for e = 0 to E − 1 do
L = CrossEntropy(y, f(x))
B = ∅, Bˆ = ∅
for l ∈ Layers(f) do
(Bupl , B
low
l ) = BoundPropagate(l, x, f)
(Bˆupl , Bˆ
low
l ) = BoundPropagate(l, x± , f)
B = B ∪ (Bupl , Blowl )
Bˆ = Bˆ ∪ (Bˆupl , Bˆlowl )
end for
LD, LV = ComputeRegLoss(B, Bˆ, f(x),m
d)
α = Anneal(α, e)
Optθ(L+ α(LD + LV ))
end for
B lowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Blowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Tl
LD
(a) Detection loss LD .
B lowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Blowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Tl
LSC = Tl Blowl
(b) Strict Certification loss LSC .
B lowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Blowl B
up
l
Dist of X
Tl
LLC = Tl Bupl
(c) Loose Certification loss LLC .
Figure 3: An illustration of CTT regularisation losses. The detection loss (LD) ensures no natural samples are detected.
Strict certification loss encourages the placement of Tl to be optimal, while loose certification loss helps Tl to achieve
the suboptimal placement.
3.5 Fine-tuning with CTT Losses
Fine-tuning networks further with CTT losses can introduce a better separation between the natural and the adversarial
sets. Unlike adversarial training, CTT fine-tuning operates on the original data; we do not generate any adversarial
inputs to train with the model, so the training overheads are lower for CTT. We present three losses related to interval
bounds that are considered as regularisations in our CTT detection. The three losses are presented in Figure 3, and they
are: 1) Detection loss LD, 2) Strict certification loss LSC , 3) Loose certification loss LLC .
Consider a masking function ml =M(xl, Tl), the output m is a binary mask of which its elementwise entry is 1 if its
corresponding elementwise entry in x is bigger than a scalar Tl, and otherwise is 0. The detection loss LD is a sum
of all activation values picked by the taboo selection mask mdl that are greater than the detection threshold Tl. The
verification losses are simply the distance between the detection threshold and the bound when the threshold is bigger
than the bound. Considering a network with N layers, we have:
LD =
N−1∑
l=0
sum(xl ·mdl ·M(xl, Tl)) (5)
LSC =
N−1∑
l=0
sum(mdl ·M(Bˆlowl , Tl) · (Tl − Bˆlowl )) (6)
LLC =
N−1∑
l=0
sum(mdl ·M(Bˆupl , Tl) · (Tl − Bˆupl )) (7)
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The function sum produces the sum of all entries of a high dimensional tensor that is the result of convolutions
(activations). Recall we previously defined the optimal and suboptimal placements of Tl in Section 3.3, the minimization
of different combination of CTT regularisation losses provide:
• If LD = 0 and LSC = 0, we are achieving the optimal placement of Tl. All adversarial inputs with its l∞
norm equals to  are detectable, and all detected samples are adversarial samples regardless of the perturbation
size. Given that test data falls into the train data distribution.
• If LD = 0 and LLC = 0, we are achieving the suboptimal placement of Tl, all detected samples are adversarial
samples regardless of the perturbation size. Given that test data falls into the train data distribution.
Table 1: A comparison between CTT-lite, CTT-loose, CTT-strict, AdvTrain [20], Ensemble [30] and PCL [29] on the
MNIST dataset. Acc means accuracy and Det means detection rate on adversarial samples.
Baseline AdvTrain Ensemble PCL CTT-lite CTT-loose CTT-strict
Attack Param Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Det l2 Acc Det l2 Acc Det l2
No Attack 99.1 99.5 99.5 99.3 99.1 1.9 - 98.5 1.6 - 98.9 1.1 -
FGSM  = 0.1 70.9 73.0 96.3 96.5 70.9 1.4 2.08 25.0 100.0 1.98 61.1 100.0 1.99
 = 0.2 21.9 52.7 52.8 77.9 21.9 1.0 4.14 15.0 100.0 3.89 32.7 100.0 3.90
BIM  = 0.1 44.2 62.0 88.5 92.1 44.2 1.0 1.13 0.0 100.0 0.38 0.15 100.0 0.75
 = 0.15 4.2 18.7 73.6 77.3 4.2 0.8 1.48 0.0 100.0 0.50 2.0 100.0 0.97
PGD  = 0.1 51.0 62.7 82.8 93.9 51.0 1.2 1.50 1.0 100.0 1.24 13.4 100.0 1.35
 = 0.2 0.0 31.9 41.0 80.2 0.0 1.1 2.73 0.0 100.0 2.43 0.9 100.0 2.53
C&W c = 0.1 99.6 71.1 97.3 97.6 99.6 25.0 0.05 34.0 90.5 0.06 79.6 91.2 0.05
c = 1.0 99.6 39.2 78.1 91.2 99.6 1.1 0.05 34.3 93.3 0.07 79.7 96.1 0.06
We present the detailed fine-tuning algorithm in Algorithm 1. The finetuning function takes a hyperparameter α, this
controls how strong the regularisation is in the optimization procedure (Opt). In practice, it is necessary to anneal
(Anneal) the value of α with respect to the number of epoch e. The other hyperparameter β is a probability between
0 to 1 that is later used to produce a set of masks md for each layer’s activations. In the meantime, the fine-tune
function considers a neural network f with trained parameters θ; x and y are the training data samples and their labels
respectively. In addition, we need a pre-defined perturbation size  for adversarial bound construction and E represents
the maximum number of epochs we would like to fine-tune for. Function CrossEntropy essentially computes the
classification loss L based on the input training data.
Consider a neural network f parameterised by θ. For each layer in the neural network f , we perform the bound
propagation (BoundPropagate) as described in Section 3.3. The bounds for both the adversarial set of inputs and
the natural set of inputs of each layer are accumulated for computing the regularisation loss using the function
ComputeRegLoss. Note that the adversarial set represents the set of inputs with a particular l∞ norm, so there is no
actual generation of adversarial samples. The function ComputeRegLoss produces two losses LD and LC ; the value
of LC can be calculated to be equal to whether LSC or LLC (Equation (6) and Equation (7)) depending on whether we
use CTT-strict or CTT-loose. Since Algorithm 1 is only a high level overview, we did not distinguish between LSC and
LLC , but call them in general LC in Algorithm 1. It is worth to note that LSC is a stronger regularisation than LLC , so
adding both regularisations is theoretically equivalent to adding only LSC . The pre-defined parameter  determines a
trade-off between accuracy, detection ratios and adversarial accuracy. In practice, we determine the value of  using a
grid search spanning values from 10−5 to 10−1, and determine its value based on the optimal performance in accuracy
and detection ratio under a simple FGSM attack with fixed l0. We explain this trade-off in details in our supplimentary
material.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Networks, Datasets and Attacks
We evaluate the proposed Certifiable Taboo Trap (CTT) on two different image datasets, MNIST [21] and CIFAR10
[19]. The MNIST dataset consists of images of hand-written digts and the number of output classes is 10. The CIFAR10
dataset is a task of classifying 60000 images into 10 classes. We use the LeNet5 [22] architecture for MNIST, and
evaluate an efficient CNN architecture (MCifarNet) from Mayo [42] that achieved a high classification accuracy using
only 1.3M parameters.
We consider gradient-based FGSM [14], FGM [14], BIM [20], PGD [20] and C&W [5] attacks with various attack
parameters. These attacks can be seen as a collection of l∞ and l2 based attacks. In addition, we provide results in
7
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Table 2: A comparison between CTT-loose, CTT-strict, AdvTrain [20], Ensemble [30] and PCL [29] on the Cifar10
dataset. Acc means accuracy and Det means detection rate on adversarial samples.
Baseline AdvTrain Ensemble PCL CTT-loose CTT-strict
Attack Param Acc Acc Acc Acc Acc Det l2 Acc Det l2 Acc Det l2
No Attack 89.1 84.5 90.6 91.9 86.2 3.4 - 86.3 6.4 - 86.1 3.0 -
FGSM  = 0.02 33.6 44.3 61.7 78.5 18.6 95.7 1.07 16.8 98.5 1.08 16.1 96.4 1.06
 = 0.04 22.4 31.0 46.2 69.9 7.6 93.6 2.00 7.2 94.2 2.01 6.0 93.1 2.06
BIM  = 0.01 13.5 22.6 46.6 74.5 0.5 9.0 0.15 0.0 14.1 0.16 1.1 10.9 0.16
 = 0.02 1.5 7.8 31.0 57.3 0.0 14.2 0.21 0.0 25.9 0.20 0.0 17.2 0.21
PGD  = 0.01 24.0 24.3 48.4 75.7 0.1 10.4 0.34 2.9 24.3 0.34 2.0 16.6 0.34
 = 0.02 2.9 7.8 30.4 48.5 0.0 40.8 0.65 0.0 70.3 0.65 0.0 49.9 0.65
C&W c = 0.01 13.5 40.9 54.9 65.7 0.2 12.9 0.09 0.1 23.4 0.10 0.5 14.5 0.09
c = 0.1 13.3 25.4 25.6 60.5 0.3 13.3 0.09 0.1 25.9 0.10 0.5 13.7 0.09
Table 3: A comparison between CTT-lite, CTT-loose, CTT-strict, Madry et al. [25], Sitatapatra [37], ABS and Binary
ABS [33] on the MNIST dataset. For detection based defense, we show results in the form of a(d), where a is accuracy
and d is detection rate. GE represents gradient estimation.
CNN Madry et al. Binary ABS ABS Sitatapatra CTT-loose CTT-strict
No Attack 99.1% 98.8% 99.0% 99.0% 99.2% (2%) 99.1% (0.5%) 98.8% (1.3%)
l2-metric ( = 1.5)
FGM 48% 96% - - 2% (3%) 4% (99%) 21%(100%)
FGM w/ GE 42% 88% 68% 89% 4% (7%) 0% (100%) 25%(100%)
Deepfool 18% 91% - - 12% (1%) 0% (100%) 77% (95.6%)
Deepfool w/ GE 30% 90% 41% 83% 6% (2%) 0% (100%) 76.5% (94.4%)
L2 BIM 13% 88% - - 0% (0%) 0% (100%) 0% (100%)
L2 BIM w/ GE 37% 88% 63% 87% 0% (3%) 0% (100%) 0% (100%)
l∞-metric ( = 0.3)
FGSM 4% 93% - - 2%(3%) 1% (99%) 2%(100%)
FGSM w/ GE 21% 89% 85% 34% 0%(2%) 0% (100%) 4% (100%)
BIM 0% 90% - - 0%(1%) 0% (100%) 0% (100%)
BIM w/ GE 37% 89% 86% 13% 0%(1%) 0% (100%) 0% (100%)
both White-box and Black-box settings. For Black-box attacks, we use gradient estimation with the coordinate-wise
finite-difference method, similar to Schott et al. [33]. The attack implementations are from Fooblox [31].
4.2 Attackers with Various Capabilities and Various Norm Bounds
Attacks can be evaluated very differently, and we offer two sets of evaluations for a thorough comparison with existing
defense methods. In the first set, we run attacks with fixed parameters and a fixed number of iterations. In the second
se, we enable early stopping for iterative attacks so that perturbation sizes are fixed. In addition, we also provide a
set of evaluation with Black-box attacks using gradient estimation. We used  = 3× 10−3 for MNIST networks, and
 = 10−4 for CIFAR10 networks. These values were determined from a grid search; there is a detailed discussion of
the grid search and an evaluation of using different  in the supplementary material. In addition, we show the detailed
hyperparameter configurations of α, β, E and  (Algorithm 1) in the supplementary material.
In Table 1 and Table 2, we present comparisons between CTT and various robust adversarial training schemes, including
AdvTrain [20], Ensemble [30] and PCL [29]. In this setup, we run attacks with fixed parameters and measure the
accuracy, detection ratios and l2 norms of the adversarial samples. BIM and PGD iterated for 10 times with a step size
of /10; CW has an iteration step of 1000, an learning rate of 0.01, a confidence value of 0.1 and a binary search step
of 1. Notice we present the baseline accuracy for the networks on which we evaluate. The baseline accuracy will be the
same as CTT-lite, since it involves no re-training of the model. CTT-lite provides limited protections against adversarial
attacks. CTT-loose and CTT-strict, however, show above 90% detection ratios across all examined attacks in Table 1. In
addition, both detection schemes provide a degree of certifiability on the detected adversarial samples. The detection
ratios when no attacks are applied are the false positives. There exists a trade-off between the false positive rates and
the detection ratios. As presented in Table 2, the two versions of CTT-loose have different false positive rates, and offer
different detection capabilities. We presents a full analysis of this trade-off in the supplementary material. Table 2
shows our detection scheme outperform robust networks on FGSM, however, provides relatively worse performance
when l2 norms are low. First, our detection offers certifiability which is not seen in any of the work compared. Second,
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the work compared does not report the l2 norm, attacks with different random starts may cause a difference in l2 norms
and also the attacking quality.
To further evaluate the CTT system, we conduct a comparison to Madry et al., Sitatapatra [37] ABS and Binary ABS
[33] under both White- and Black-Box attacks on the MNIST dataset. This time, we provide a noise budget to each
attack. The Black-Box attacks are constructed using gradient estimation, we see almost all CTT-loose and CTT-strict
results show above 90% detection ratios on adversarial samples while keeping the false positives low. Our detection
results outperform all other competitors focusing solely on improving model robustness. An important observation
is that our detection method reduces the adversarial accuracy of the neural network model. This phenomenon is
apparent in Table 1, as all robustness-based defenses have higher accuracy in comparison to CTT on adversarial images.
Intuitively, CTT enforces the natural and the adversarial sets to be separated by the detection thresholds. The CTT
models are thus more sensitive to adversarial samples because of this enforcement — we observe that selected neurons
get suppressed for natural and get non-zero values for adversarial inputs. Furthermore, our detection is certifiable
based on an assumption that the test and train data follows the same distribution. In theory, if this assumption is true,
CTT-strict will show 100% detection on all attacks that are above a certain given l∞; which is exactly the case shown in
Table 1 with l∞-based attacks. For l2-based attacks, it is hard to ensure every pixel is under the given certifiable limit,
however, our method practically capture many adversaries with high detection rates.
4.3 Runtime Overheads and Security Protocols
The proposed CTT system has low running overheads in comparison to other detection systems (SafetyNet [24] and
MagNet [26]), we present the run-time comparison in appendix. It is similar to Sitatapatra [37], which is another
derivative of Taboo Trap; CTT supports the concept of embedding keys in each neural network to diversify models
under adversarial attack. The key is embedded via the mask and can support complex security protocols; a detailed
analysis of key attribution and runtime overheads can be found in Shumailov et al. and these advantages are equally
applicable to CTT.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the Certifiable Taboo Trap CTT), a new way to defend neural networks against adversarial
samples by detecting them. We discussed three different modes which provide different detection capabilities and
levels of certifiability at different training costs. All variants of CTT have a small run-time overhead, and can be
customised with the equivalent of cryptographic keys. The stronger variants of CTT have extra training but this is used
to characterise propagation bounds rather than to defend against specific adversarial samples, yielding a more flexible
and general defense mechanism.
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Appendices
A Training procedure
In this section we explain how to train a CTT instrumented model. First, most of the commonly used optimisers are
suitable for CTT training. However, it should be noted that there exists an interaction between the CTT penalty (the
additional loss term introduced by CTT) and the weight decay of the optimizer. Although we have not evaluated this
interaction formally, we find it easier to train models when the weight decay is either turned off or set to a very small
value. The optimizer used in our experiments is RMSProp.
The annealing procedure for CTT parameters is important for convergence. The parameter α determines the strength
of the CTT penalty, and we increase α iteratively by a factor of β every t training epochs. For both MNIST and
FashionMNIST, we used t = 6, β = 0.005. For CIFAR10, we used t = 30, β = 0.001. We find that the best way to
train the models is to first optimise LV , i.e. make sure that neurons have a bound larger than Tl and then start iteratively
increasing α. We hypothesise that this works in line with recent findings that there exist a number of connected
convergence clusters with similar performance [12] with a path between them. Iteratively increasing α allows us to
keep convergence, while maintaining low LV loss and decreasing the false positive rate.
B Parameter Selection
In this section we try to explain intuition behind CTT and the instrumentation parameter () choice. Algorithm 1 in the
paper presents the whole procedure we have used to successfully train both CTT-loose and CTT-strict.
First, the parameter  can be thought of as a detectability certification of an adversarial sample. It defines the minimum
theoretical perturbation size for which the detector should work. In other words, when training the classifier with CTT,
we generate adversarial bounds up to a limit of . Rather than generating adversarial samples, we use a natural sample
perturbed by . The CTT loss tries to ensure that when adversarial samples X ±  are considered, the detector neurons
can be turned on.
CTT may be understood in contrast with the work of Cohen et al. in certifiable robustness [8]. Certifiable robustness
aims at making natural sample behaviour stay in a pre-formed lp ball, so that model behaviour is stable in a natural
range of values. CTT, on the other hand, aims at detecting illegal behaviours outside of this lp ball, so that behaviour
outside of the natural range is unstable. The intuition is that the smaller you make this lp norm for CTT, the the easier
we can detect adversarial behaviours.
Figure 4 shows the trade-off between detector performance and -choice using CTT-loose. First, the pre-defined  does
not guarantee that all adversarial samples above this  will be detected (only CTT-strict guarantees this). Second, there
is an optimal  we can choose to maximize the detectability. Third, unlike adversarial training, CTT does not rely on a
particular attack during training. As shown in Figure 4, the performance of different attacks (PGD and FGSM) shows
almost no difference and the attack quality seems to be only related to the perturbation size rather than generation
procedure. Finally, the left-most point shown in Figure 4 refers to  = 10−5. It seems that for a given architecture and a
given dataset there exists a smallest  one could successfully train the model for. For MNIST with LeNet5 we struggled
to find a reproducible way to train the model for epsilons below 0.0007.
C FashionMNIST vs MNIST
MNIST is a popular benchmark, but is known to be relatively simple [21]. Xiao et al. proposed FashionMNIST [41], a
more complex, yet still simple toy dataset. In this section we report on results of CTT-loose instrumentation of LeNet5
networks solving FashionMNIST with  = 0.001, meaning that the adversarial set includes perturbed images with an
l∞ size of 0.001.
In addition to the attacks presented in the evaluation section, we also show here the results for a decision-based attack [3].
The attack itself is particularly interesting as it is not based on any gradient information, meaning CTT detection is not
network-information specific. For this attack, we use 25 trials per iteration and vary the number of iterations.
Table 4 shows the results of attacking CTT-loose instrumented LeNet5. In the evaluation section of the paper we have
shown that for MNIST CTT detection was capable of capturing almost all of the adversarial samples. Unlike MNIST,
CTT fails to detect all of the adversarial samples on FashionMNIST.
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Figure 4: Trade-off between choices of  and detector performance. There are five LeNet5 networks classifying MNIST,
instrumented with CTT-loose with Tl = 10−4 with a given . The networks are trained to a false positive rate of 2%.
Points show median performance, whereas error bars refer to standard deviations of the 5 networks.
As already noted, there is a relationship between the attack perturbation size, dataset specifics, and the detectability of
CTT. In the case of FashionMNIST, for the particular  value, we find it shows relatively better detection rate for small
l2 values.
Table 4: CTT-loose instrumented LeNet5 network classifying FashionMNIST.
θ l2 CTT-loose
No Attack 85.3% (5.3%) 84.4% (2.7%)
FGSM
 = 0.006 0.10 64.73% (75.33%) 65.14% (39.66%)
 = 0.007 0.12 60.79% (71.01%) 62.74% (39.68%)
 = 0.01 0.17 52.32% (61.80%) 56.97% (38.55%)
 = 0.03 0.52 22.62% (54.42%) 24.40% (44.52%)
 = 0.05 0.88 11.72% (56.11%) 12.62% (49.79%)
 = 0.07 1.23 6.61% (59.63%) 8.29% (51.51%)
Boundary
i = 10 1.96 0.00% (28.19%) 0.00% (20.19%)
i = 50 1.62 0.00% (27.61%) 0.00% (23.44%)
i = 100 1.23 0.00% (29.23%) 0.00% (24.52%)
i = 500 0.24 0.00% (60.90%) 0.00% (38.94%)
i = 1000 0.15 0.00% (65.31%) 0.00% (44.27%)
D Detectability trade-off
In this section we show the impact of different false positive rates on the CTT-loose instrumentation. We use 5 LeNet5
networks and train each of them with the same CTT-loose restrictions but stop at different training times so that networks
achieve different false-positive rates. Figure 5 presents the false positive rate trade-off two specific attacks, with false
positive rates on the x-axis and detectability on the y-axis.
The relationship between detector performance and false positive rates indicates a trade-off of interest when applying
CTT-loose in practice. With a slight increase of false positive rates (1% to 3%), we increase the detector performance
by around 20%. Intuitively, this suggests first, that there exist inefficiencies in the internal representations of the neural
network, where the network struggles to separate natural and non-natural samples. Second, this trade-off between false
positive rates and detectability can occur because of imperfections of the training dataset. The natural training dataset
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Figure 5: Trade-off between choices of false positive rates and detector performance. There are five LeNet5 networks
classifying FashionMNIST, instrumented with CTT-loose with Tl = 10−4 with a given  = 0.005. Points show median
performance, whereas error bars refer to standard deviations.
involves imperfect, confusing images for the network, and thus causing a vague boundary between the natural and
adversarial input sets. It should be noted that although this relationship exists across different datasets and models, its
scaling seems to be dataset-dependent.
E Run-time overheads
Previously, Shumailov et al. demonstrated that Taboo Trap adds no extra inference cost and utilises zero additional
device memory when deployed. In comparison, MagNet [26] and SafetyNet [24] show 20% and 3600% increases in
terms of additional parameters when deployed [36]. As mentioned in our paper, CTT shares the same detection mindset
as Taboo Trap, and thus enjoy the benefit of having zero extra cost in network inference as well. Unlike [36] however
we instrument less than 0.1% of all neurons available in the network. That in turn means that fewer detector neurons are
required for much better detection.
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